

on the forest resources of the Appalachian region and adjacent areas.

2. To determine and test the economic and practical feasibility of adopting improved methods for increasing the efficiency of timber harvesting, transporting, processing, and marketing and leading to improved market acceptance for wood products.

3. To evaluate the alternative opportunities of developing new or expanded markets for Appalachian timber products.

4. To determine the need for specific improvements or changes in the products to better satisfy market needs and to arrange for the development of these improvements and changes as necessary.

5. To isolate and analyze specific market problems as they occur in the wood-products industry and to develop measures as needed for their solution.

6. To investigate different measures of improving the financial, organizational, and operational structure of wood-products industries so that they can become more competitive with other industries.

7. To develop and maintain a comprehensive knowledge of the market and production structure for the principal forest-product industries for those who might benefit from this information.

8. To develop and contribute knowledge about the theory and methodology of forest-products-marketing research.

9. To compile, assemble, and provide technical advice and information needed by other researchers, technicians, entrepreneurs, and industrial promoters for the establishment or operation of forest-product industries.

10. To provide technical assistance to others in the dissemination of information leading to advances in the technology of preparing and marketing forest products.

SCOPE OF RESEARCH PROGRAM

The Princeton Laboratory is charged with the primary responsibility for all Federal marketing research in the Appalachian highland region of the Eastern United States.

Although centered in West Virginia, most of the research to be conducted at this location will apply throughout the Appalachian highlands and adjacent areas, and to some extent in all the hardwood-producing areas of the Eastern United States. Some timber-products-marketing problems are primarily local, but in most cases hardwood timber products in one State are distributed and sold throughout a number of States, some far from the producing areas. Thus most marketing-research projects must necessarily be regional and interstate in character.

Although primarily concerned with Appalachian hardwoods, the Princeton Laboratory will also be concerned with improving markets for all eastern hardwoods and softwoods and all other native woods as the need arises.

OPERATION OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAM

The Princeton research program is divided into four separate but closely related fields of investigation. One project will work toward improving markets for primary forest products such as saw logs, pulpwood, veneer bolts, and poles. Another project will be concerned with markets for primary manufacturers, including lumber, veneer, and composition boards. A third project will concentrate on improving markets for secondary manufactured wood products such as flooring, furniture, millwork, and pallets. The fourth line of research will be devoted to improving markets for wood in construction of all types—residential, industrial, farm, public, and other nonresidential construction uses.

Each of these lines of research at first involves studies in market analyses (fact-finding studies), followed by more complex studies of consumer preferences and the possible deficiencies of wood products or the ways in which wood products are marketing

that limit their marketability. In general, the selection of studies will be based on market problems of specific wood products or groups of products.

Research covering each problem area in the subproject—or a product or group of products within the problem area—will be carried out in four distinct steps or phases.

The first step will be a problem analysis encompassing the collection and analysis of information about the structure of the markets and production facilities for the product or group of products under study. This initial step will delineate the market problems of size, importance, and location, and will provide information about the trend in future markets. This is the "what" approach.

The second step will involve studies to determine and evaluate the factors that are responsible for the market losses or are restricting the markets for the product or group of products under investigation. Information will be developed to reveal the specific reasons why the wood products under investigation are not fully meeting or satisfying the consumers' needs or preferences; or what characteristic of the product, its distribution system, or its application needs improvement to better satisfy market needs. In short, this phase of the research is aimed to determine what needs to be done to improve the market demand for the products in question. This is the "why" approach. Priorities for future research will be established at this point.

The third step—and this is where the payoff begins—is the investigation of measures for correcting the deficiencies that limit marketability and use. This may involve studies aimed at improving or modifying the product, changing merchandising and distribution methods, improving knowledge of consumers' needs and preferences, improving manufacturing processes to reduce product cost and market price, or improving utilization of the available wood materials. And, in some instances, a need may be apparent for developing a new or essentially new product to fill the market needs. This is the stage of hypothesis.

The fourth and final step in the research operation involves the application and field testing of the measures proposed for the solution of the market problems. This can be accomplished through the dissemination of information in publications and other written media, explanations before public and industry agencies and groups, demonstrations at the methods testing plant, or by pilot-test operations at the plants of cooperators.

In general, research efforts will be concentrated in sufficient force on each of the marketing problems selected for study to have an appreciable impact on the market problems. This aim is to conduct research in depth on selected problems in preference to the shotgun approach in which research efforts are scattered over the entire range of program responsibility.

PILOT-PLANT TESTING

Market investigations at the Princeton Laboratory will frequently point out the need for further studies involving the conduct of technological research in wood products. Experimentation will be needed to test the economics and practical feasibility of new processes, methods, or equipment, or the quality and utility of new or improved products. The collection of facts leads to analyses; the analytical studies lead in turn to hypotheses that should be investigated by physical tests for product improvements.

These prospective improvements may be pilot-tested at the Laboratory's methods testing plant, or in industrial plants, or at other Federal, State, or private research installations. Whenever possible, these technological operations will be correlated with the work and programs of other agencies.

In general, physical research operations at the Laboratory's methods testing plant and experimental woodyard will be limited to problems, or segments of problems, that other government or private groups are not covering or are unwilling or unable to cover in sufficient detail for the requirements of the Laboratory program. These pilot tests will be limited to investigations of the economic and practical feasibility of improved methods for manufacturing, using, or marketing wood products.

The Princeton Laboratory will not conduct exploratory or basic research in forest product technology at the methods testing plant. Nor will research be conducted toward the development of new wood products, although new or improved products and processes may be pilot tested to determine the economic and physical practicality of their manufacture.

RESEARCH IN PRIMARY FOREST PRODUCTS

Studies now underway by the Laboratory in the field of primary forest products include an analysis of the organization, operation, and accomplishments of private landowners, forest product marketing, and service organizations. Another study is determining the cost and practicality of hardwood log grading as a marketing tool for forest landowners. One other short-term investigation is evaluating the supply, price, and quality factors as they affect the opportunities for hardwood veneer and plywood manufacture in West Virginia.

RESEARCH IN PRIMARY WOOD-PRODUCT MANUFACTURES

Work now underway in the field of primary wood-product manufactures includes two studies that are attempting to improve lumber markets through better seasoning practices. One involves the determination and evaluation of commercial air-drying practices as they affect the quality, value, utility, and marketability of hardwood lumber; the other is an economic analysis of forced-air drying processes.

Other studies now underway in the field of primary wood-product manufacturers are aimed at improving market potentials through better conversion practices. Examples are: analysis of the trends in the hardwood log recovery values (lumber prices) in the Appalachian area; an economic evaluation of factory grade 3 hardwood saw logs as raw material for Appalachian sawmills; a determination of the changes in logging and sawmilling costs in the past 10 years and their effect on these operations; and an economic analysis of the marketability and value of alternative products cut from low-grade portions of saw logs.

Another field of investigation is represented by a study involving the determination of preferences and specifications for hardwood lumber by the furniture, pallet, and flooring industries. Recent difficulties of the railroad industry in obtaining an adequate supply of hardwood railway ties has prompted the laboratory to begin investigations aimed at the discovery and elimination, if possible, of this market problem.

RESEARCH IN SECONDARY WOOD-PRODUCT MANUFACTURES

Research efforts in the field of secondary wood-product manufactures have been concentrated so far on studies of the markets and associated problems for hardwood flooring and hardwood pallets. Studies directed at improving the flooring markets began with a problem analysis. On the basis of this analysis, one study is now underway to determine the factors involved in the use of hardwood flooring in slab-type construction. The great increase in on-slab construction of housing was found to be one of the principal factors that limited the market for hardwood flooring. Another study involves investigating the comparative difficulty and cost of maintenance of hardwood and other

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competing flooring materials. A third study will be concerned with the relative difficulty and cost of maintaining wooden floors and other flooring materials in school buildings.

A problem analysis has also been completed for the wooden pallet industry. On the basis of the analysis, plans for investigating market problems or uncovering market opportunities are being prepared. One study deals with the determination of market satisfaction and value to the user of different types of wooden pallets through service tests. Other studies in the planning stage will be concerned with determining and evaluating specific opportunities to increase the use of wooden pallets in different segments of the food-handling industry and comparing handling systems using wooden pallets with those using nonwood pallets or with those systems that do not require pallets of any type.

RESEARCH IN WOOD FOR CONSTRUCTION

Under preparation at the Laboratory, in the field of marketing wood for construction uses, is one study involving the evaluation of factors affecting the selection and use of wood materials for different components of school construction. Another study covering the opportunities for increasing the use of wooden guardrail posts in West Virginia highway construction has been completed and a report is being prepared for publication.

STAFF AND FACILITIES

The Princeton program calls for a total staff of 25 scientists and an equal number of technicians, clerks, and other supporting personnel. Approximately one-half of the professional and supporting staff has been recruited. The present scientific group includes forest economists, forest-product specialists, research foresters, and one agricultural economist.

The Laboratory is located on 96 acres of land donated to the Federal Government by the people of Mercer County, W. Va. The land contains two tracts, one of 32 acres and one of 64 acres. The headquarters buildings occupy the smaller tract, along with a 20-acre exhibit forest. A second large building, the methods testing plant, is located on the larger tract; it will be the central facility in the Laboratory's experimental woodyard.

The headquarters building, which contains 13,000 square feet of air-conditioned floor-space, was completed and occupied in the fall of 1963. The total cost was approximately \$450,000 for design, construction, and development of the site and utilities. A nearby garage-shop building includes storage space for vehicles and a carpenter and general repair shop used for maintenance work and the construction of exhibits for the more than 40 display cases in the headquarters building and exhibit forest.

The nearly completed methods testing plant is approximately the same size as the headquarters building. It includes a large testroom with 10,000 square feet of unobstructed floorspace spanned by 64-foot-long wooden trusses. The cost for construction, when all site and utility developments are completed, will run slightly over \$200,000. Except for the concrete foundation and floors, this building is constructed almost exclusively of wood. The plant has been designed so that it can accommodate nearly all types of pilot-plant work in the wood-products field.

Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, business is closed.

MANPOWER ACT OF 1965

Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate

resume the consideration of Calendar No. 114, S. 974.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which is S. 974.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 974) to amend the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. GORE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE VIETNAM CRISIS

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, few subjects in the past weeks have received as much attention, as much discussion or as much legitimate concern as the subject of the brewing crisis in southeast Asia. I wish to add my views to those who have joined in this discussion.

Unfortunately, I do not possess some positive panacea to this problem. To say that the problems of South Vietnam are complex is in itself an oversimplification. But one fact does appear clear—the American people must be made aware of these complexities.

The people of this great land have shown resolute willingness to support a course of action required to protect the freedoms they cherish. They have repeatedly stood ready to make the sacrifices necessary to make this world a better place in which to live. But this resolution in the past has been based on a clear understanding of the course which must be followed to secure our national goals. Similar resolution and determination in support of a course of action in South Vietnam today requires similar understanding on the part of the citizenry of this great land.

What is the picture in South Vietnam? What are the facts that confront America and Americans in that far-off corner of the world? First, it should be understood that the South Vietnamese crisis has no simple, easy solution. It has been developing for a number of years and, as much as we might wish, will not be wished away overnight.

We, as Americans, are at our best when the task before us is clear. Under such circumstances, we have exhibited an unlimited ability and determination to meet any call. For example, there was no question about the task before us when the Kaiser's forces were threatening to overrun Europe in World War I, when the Nazis had enslaved Europe in World War II and when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The task and course were clear.

The issues confronting the United States in southeast Asia are not as obvious as those of World War I or II, nor are the U.S. interests involved so apparent. But let us pray to God that

this generation of Americans will exhibit similar determination, courage, perseverance, imagination, and foresight to meet problems of similar gravity and magnitude which are not as well defined today.

To those who like to consider world problems as neat little packages which can be solved simply, each one to be tied with a different colored ribbon, placed quietly in the corner and then move on to the next, South Vietnam offers little comfort.

The problems of South Vietnam are not only complex, but at times seem to defy solution. The results of both action and inaction at times appear equally undesirable, while the consequences to mankind of miscalculation are too horrible to contemplate. But we will never improve the situation, let alone remove the dangers confronting freemen in southeast Asia, until we recognize what the real problems are, the alternative solutions to these problems, and the ultimate effects and consequences of each proposed solution.

The most oft heard comment concerning South Vietnam is that: "We should never have been there in the first place." This may or may not be the case. But to spend much time and resources arguing this point does little but confuse the issue. The decision to make U.S. influence felt in South Vietnam was made a decade ago. This decision has been supported by three Presidents and by both political parties. Right or wrong, like it or not, we are in South Vietnam today. This Nation is committed to a course of action in southeast Asia. The question is: Is the present course of action still wise? If not, how then do we change it, or, in fact, if there is no wise action for this country to follow in southeast Asia, then how do we get out?

The U.S. Government, as we all recall, was requested by the legitimately constituted Government of South Vietnam to assist the small nation in its effort to protect itself against the encroachment of communism. During the past several years hard core guerrilla fighters have infiltrated into South Vietnam from North Vietnam—its neighbor to the north.

The Vietcong's "hard core" forces now number about 35,000, with 60,000 to 80,000 local, part-time guerrillas backing them up. Moreover, since 1959 at least 20,000 and perhaps as many as 37,000 infiltrators have entered South Vietnam from the north.

The guerrilla activities have spread. The countryside has been terrorized. Three thousand to four thousand village leaders have been murdered or kidnapped each year. Modern weapons have been shipped into South Vietnam in increasingly large numbers from North Vietnam, from Red China, and other Communist nations, as the recent State Department white paper so adequately pointed out.

In the face of these terrorist tactics we have attempted to assist South Vietnam by strengthening that nation economically and militarily. Hundreds of millions of dollars—as we all know, having had to appropriate them—have been spent in this effort. American fighting

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men are presently stationed in South Vietnam. Each daily headline brings additional evidence of sacrifice, contributions and the efforts that this country is making to protect the people of South Vietnam from enslavement by communism. Yet, despite the American contribution, despite the effort we are making, despite the growing American casualty list, until recently, American direct military involvement was small when compared to that of the South Vietnamese. As of January 1, 1965, American military forces totaled 23,000 while the South Vietnam Army numbered 240,000 with an additional 239,000 men comprising part-time, paramilitary forces. As of March 8, 303 Americans were killed and 1,913 Americans were wounded due to hostilities.

South Vietnam losses totaled 26,000. I might add the Vietcong lost 85,000 during the same period.

Yet the present course of action has not made South Vietnam a safe country. It has not created conditions upon which governmental stability can exist. The Communists appear to have increased their determination to overrun the country.

Despite the adversities that apparently confront us in South Vietnam, during that same period Vietcong guerrillas, the Communists, lost approximately 85,000.

Perhaps we should ask ourselves, what alternatives are open to us as a nation? Three basic alternatives are suggested by those who have expressed their concern over the South Vietnamese situation. Most Americans who suggest one of these alternatives are undoubtedly sincere in feeling that their prescribed course of action is in the best interest of our country. But, unfortunately, all too often those proposing one solution or the other fail to follow it to its final consummation or to consider all the eventualities of following such a course. Is there an easy course of action to follow in South Vietnam? Let us examine the alternatives.

In attempting to answer that question, I should like for a moment or two to examine the alternative to which I have earlier referred.

The first suggestion is that we should attack. We should commit large numbers of ground troops and unleash our air force. We should show the Communists that we mean business. Proponents of this course of action say that America has never lost a war and that we should not let Communist guerrillas 8,000 miles away push us around. It is said that since we have more military might than the rest of the world combined, we should not tolerate being pushed around. I suppose that such a call to arms is a natural patriotic response on the part of many, but such a call to arms must also accept the realities of the present situation in Southeast Asia.

It is difficult to fight a war halfway around the globe, to fight a war where all supplies, from bullets to bombs and socks to shells, must be shipped 8,000 miles. It is difficult to fight a guerrilla war and, like it or not, this is the type of

struggle in the jungle, the swamps, and the hamlets of Southeast Asia. It is a guerrilla war, not a traditional type of war.

The history of fighting Communist guerrillas in the Philippines, Malaya, and more recent, now, in South Vietnam indicates that to be successful in such a struggle the struggle the guerrilla forces must be outmanned approximately 10 to 1. South Vietnam is presently preparing to increase the size of its Army by 100,000 men. But even this increase to a total army strength of 340,00 regular troops or 629,000 men, including para-military forces, appears to be insufficient in the light of increased Communist infiltration from the north.

Actually winning the war in South Vietnam in the swamps, the jungles, and the villages would entail a commitment of large numbers of United States troops—troops to fight a land war in Asia. The commitment of large numbers of American fighting troops in South Vietnam would in all probability bring the North Vietnamese Regular Army into the struggle. They are not at present in it. The North Vietnam Army numbers approximately 490,000. It is well trained and equipped. In addition, there is the possibility that tens or hundreds of thousands of Chinese volunteers also would be committed to the struggle as was the case in Korea. This, of course, would entail the commitment of even larger numbers of American troops.

To be sure, and to be realistic, there is no certainty that North Vietnam or China will become further involved in the future. But there is also no certainty that they will not. Those who advocate a land war for United States troops in Asia had best examine all possible ramifications of such a policy.

To those who feel that this attack-and-win theory is the easy solution to the South Vietnam problem let me point out that the French were engaged in southeast Asia for approximately 9 years. During this period they committed over 250,000 French troops to the struggle. Total French casualties reached 19,000 men killed. In the final analysis, the French suffered a humiliating defeat.

In Korea, which is of more personal interest to us in America, U.S. forces reached a maximum strength of 328,000 troops. Other nations, including South Korea, committed forces totaling more than 300,000. During the duration of the Korean war, 1,789,000 American servicemen served in Korea at one time or the other. The United States—to look at the cold, hard statistics—suffered 33,629 killed and 103,284 wounded in Korea, and the truce which followed was a truce, not a victory. We need to remind ourselves that there was no victory in that war; we are still required to keep thousands of men in Korea to maintain the truce.

Are we today willing to wage a similar type conflict in South Vietnam, with similar loss of blood and suffering by Americans?

To be sure, we have the capability of devastating North Vietnamese and Chinese military installations, industry, and cities from the air. This could well de-

ter their full-scale participation in the South Vietnamese struggle. But it seems to me there is no magic mathematical formula to determine if this deterrent will be sufficient to keep the North Vietnamese and Chinese from a full-scale invasion of South Vietnam, nor do we know at what time our attacks on China would involve Russian retaliation which, in turn, could involve the entire world in a nuclear exchange in which there would be no victory whatsoever—and certainly no victor.

On the world scene another factor must be considered. The breach between Red China and Russia appears to be growing wider. Numerous cracks are developing in the heretofore impenetrable solidarity of communism. Certainly this is in the best interest of the United States and the rest of the free world. Would U.S. air attacks on Red China solidify the Communists? Could they patch up their differences in the light of attack by a common enemy? We do not know for certain. But certainly such a possibility must be considered.

Another easy solution which is oftentimes suggested is retreat—that America should recall her troops and her weapons and, since we should not have been in South Vietnam in the first place, nothing would be lost to retreat now. As I mentioned earlier, the initial involvement in southeast Asia is not now the question. We are there. The Communists know we are there. The noncommitted nations, as well as our allies, know we are there. They are watching to see how we respond.

Do we treat with little regard the safety and freedom of the people of South Vietnam whom we have pledged to help? Are we willing to subject the entire areas of southeast Asia, including our friends and able allies in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, to Communist enslavement? There can be little question that, if we are to turn tail and run, the entire southeast Asia area—South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and even the possibility that India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, who are under increasing pressure from the Huks once again, would come under Communist domination.

True, southeast Asia is 8,000 miles away. It is not in our sphere. But, those who advocate this course of action must realize that the action which the United States takes in southeast Asia will have lasting repercussions in other areas of the world. Indeed, the developing nations of the world are watching closely to see if we really mean what we say about the freedom of mankind and about our willingness to fight to protect it. I think it is fair to say that all the nations of the world with whom we have agreements and contractual relationships are watching closely. Our neighbors in this hemisphere are wondering what the United States will do under pressure. If we prove by our action or our inaction in southeast Asia that the United States can be threatened or bullied into submission, then the "paper tiger's" tail will be twisted again and again. Our allies will desert us and the developing nations of the world will look to others to cham-

pion their cause. The net result will be that the smoldering embers of communism will burst into flame throughout the world.

The most often discussed solution to the South Vietnamese problem is that of negotiation. And indeed any permanent and lasting solution to the problems confronting us in this area will require negotiation discussions among all countries involved. It seems all too realistic that we shall have to recognize this. But the United States cannot negotiate with a Communist foe who is unwilling to negotiate, who will use the negotiating table merely as a propaganda camouflage to hide continued aggression until South Vietnam has fallen under complete Communist domination. Indeed, it is fair for us to ask why should the Communists negotiate if they are free to murder South Vietnamese village leaders, bomb and shell American airfields and command posts, and infiltrate fighters and weaponry without the slightest reprisal or risk of damage. Why should the Communists negotiate if they are free to murder American boys and the only admonishment that we express is "naughty, naughty" in a diplomatic pouch? Indeed it seems to me the answer to these questions is simple. Under such circumstances they will not negotiate.

Certainly this country and the entire world learned following the unfortunate circumstances at Munich prior to World War I that negotiation itself does not solve world problems. Rather, as was the case in Munich, as we all well remember, premature and incomplete negotiation led to a bloody world conflict.

We are dealing with Communist conspirators who frankly make no bones about the fact that they desire to conquer the world. They possess an insatiable appetite. Merely saying that we desire to negotiate will not satisfy this appetite. Our enemies in South Vietnam will only negotiate for peace when they cannot win in battle. The Communists will not stop their reign of terror and war until the cost to them of such a continued course of action is too expensive for them to bear.

To be successful, negotiation must come at a time and must be held in a manner to guarantee a lasting solution not merely a pause in the chain of conflict in that area. I am in favor of negotiating a peace that will enable American military might to be withdrawn from South Vietnam in return for guaranteed protection for the rights of the people of the area so that they may determine what kind of life they want to live without interference from other countries. But, in speaking of negotiation, we must realize the dangers involved in and the practical prerequisites necessary to negotiating with tyrants. Freedom-loving people negotiate out of a desire for peace, but tyrants negotiate only out of a necessity for peace.

I, for one, am in favor of finding peaceful means to solve the differences of opinion which exist in South Vietnam, provided such means protect the territorial and political rights of the South Vietnamese, and provided further that

such means will not sanction concession or capitulation to the Communists.

Certainly we learned that Communist promises cannot be taken at face value. They cannot be trusted. Events in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Greece, Cuba, as well as southeast Asia, to name but a few, have given us ample evidence of Communist treachery. Any agreement with the Communists must contain adequate safeguard and inspection to insure enforcement.

In determining future U.S. policy, should we attack, retreat, or negotiate, and, if so, when? We in the U.S. Senate and leaders throughout this land have a responsibility to speak out, to be heard, to carry our voice to the highest council of the land, to have our judgments weighed in the balance as such a decision is being made. This is our responsibility and the fulfillment of this responsibility, it seems to me, will assist in the formulation of the most sound policy for our country. Just as a ship on the high seas or a jet airliner in the sky above can, by necessity, have only one captain, so the United States of America can have only one Commander in Chief, the President. The President of the United States is in the best position to have all of the facts necessary to make a final judgment on this critical matter. God help him in his deliberations. It is his responsibility to chart the foreign policy of this country.

In summary, we were invited to South Vietnam by its legally constituted government to protect its citizens from Communist aggression. This goal still remains. We seek no possession, no conquest and, indeed, no expansion of the conflict.

Although the situation in South Vietnam is a continually changing one, subject to continued reevaluation, it seems to me, if we are to successfully meet the challenge, we must adhere to certain basic criteria.

First. We must provide each American fighting man who is called to serve in that area with the maximum security practicable and the most modern weapons available in our arsenal.

Second. We must show the Communists and indeed the entire world that aggression does not pay. In fact, aggression must be made sufficiently costly to deter it. We must make it crystal clear that the United States will not permit the existence of a sanctuary in which aggressors are free from retaliation. There must be no Yalu Rivers to prohibit just retribution. Our present air attacks are designed to accomplish this specific purpose.

Third. We must continue our efforts to strengthen and stabilize the government of South Vietnam. Indeed, a stable central government is the foundation of lasting peace throughout that country. A lasting government which can provide for the needs of its people. A popular government, creating a climate in which the people of South Vietnam can provide the everyday essentials of life for themselves, is the only permanent deterrent to Communist aggression. Let us, therefore, realize that programs to build schools, to combat disease and sickness,

to improve agricultural techniques, and thus provide more adequate nourishment for the population, to eliminate corruption which saps the strength of the entire economic system—these programs are as important to lasting peace in South Vietnam as the maintenance of adequate military protection. We must increase our efforts to implement these programs at all levels throughout South Vietnam. To put it briefly, we must equip the South Vietnamese with the schools, the skills, the crops and the courage to provide for themselves.

Fourth. We must continue to search for means to accomplish our goals in South Vietnam which will not necessitate military conflict. We must remain ready to reason when our adversary's reason returns.

There are those who, I recognize, have pointed to the overinvolvement of the United States in the affairs of other countries. I respect their judgment.

There are some, including Members of this body, whose judgment I respect equally, who point to mistakes which have been made in our foreign policy. There are those who say we cannot be the policeman for the world. Perhaps this is all true. Certainly we cannot be the policeman for the world. But make no mistake about it. The wave of communism which threatens the homes of South Vietnam, if unchecked today, can become a tidal wave rushing toward our own homes tomorrow.

We seek no colonies, no servitude, no reparations—only the existence of an atmosphere which will enable the people of this world to live a better life in peace and freedom. And in southeast Asia, I think everyone in this country prays for the day when the people of South Vietnam will be able to provide for their own basic needs and be able to determine the type of government under which they desire to live. We in this country desire and demand only right and justice for the people of South Vietnam. When these goals for South Vietnam can be accomplished and protected at the bargaining table, I am for it. And I, for one, believe that the President is right in his present judgment that this time has not yet arrived.

RECESS TO 2 P.M.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 2 o'clock p.m. today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none; and it is so ordered.

Thereupon (at 1 o'clock and 32 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess until 2 o'clock p.m. today.

On the expiration of the recess, at 2 o'clock p.m. the Senate reassembled, and was called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. MONTROYA in the chair).

MANPOWER ACT OF 1965

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. A bill (S. 974) to amend the Manpower Development and